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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS - INSURANCE CONTRACTS -
APPLICATION OF THE FORUM LAW
Johnston v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n (S.C. 1963)
Plaintiff, a resident of South Carolina, purchased a health
and accident insurance policy from defendant, a New York
corporation. The policy, mailed in New York and received in
South Carolina, provided coverage of $10,000.00 for loss of
one hand and one foot, or $5,000.00 for loss of one hand or
one foot. The word loss was defined as actual severance at or
above the wrist or ankle. The policy provided that the con-
tract would be construed according to the laws of New York
and also contained a two year statute of limitations. These
provisions conflicted with the South Carolina Insurance Code.
Section 37-141 provides that all contracts of insurance on
property, lives or interest located in South Carolina axe
deemed made therein and subject to its laws, section 37-465
defines loss as including loss of the four fingers entire and
section 37-474(11) provides for a six year statute of lim-
itation on actions arising under health and accident policies.
Subsequently, plaintiff accidentally lost four fingers of his
left hand and had his foot severed above the ankle. Plaintiff,
having made claim, received defendant's draft for $5,279.00
as payment in full. Accompanying defendant's draft was a
letter stating that the loss-of-hand benefit was payable only
in case of amputation. Plaintiff later instituted suit for an
additional $5,000.00 for the loss of a hand and $216.00 for
medical benefits.
The question presented was whether South Carolina law
was applicable to determine the rights of parties under an in-
surance contract issued by a foreign corporation not licensed
to do business within the state. The trial court, in directing a
verdict for the defendant, held that the contract was entered
into in the State of New York and was to be construed in
accordance with the laws of that State. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court held that in light of the statute providing that
contracts of insurance on property, lives or interests located
in state axe deemed made therein and subject to its insurance
laws, it was immaterial where the contract was technically
entered into, when South Carolina has sufficient connection
1
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with the contract that public policy demands that it conform
with the requirements of the Insurance Code. Johnston v.
Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n, - S.C. -, 131
S.E.2d 91 (1963).1
No area in the conflict of laws is more uncertain than that
of contracts.2 The greatest divergence in this area occurs in
determining the essential validity of a contract.3 Decisions
as to the validity of a contract have generally been classified
into three rules,4 each of which has been followed as well as
criticized.
The first rule is that the law of the place where the con-
tract was made (lex loci contractus) determines its validity.5
This approach affords a single and ascertainable set of laws
to govern the contract; however, the place where the contract
was made may have only a casual connection with a contract,
performance of which is to occur elsewhere.
The second rule makes the law of the place of performance
controlling.6 While this approach provides a more substantial
connection with the transaction than does lex loci contractus,
the difficulty is that often the contract calls for performance
in two or more states. The third rule permits the intention of
the parties to fix the law governing the contract.7 While this
appears practical, more often than not, the intent of the parties
is not readily ascertainable, thus the courts are required to
1. The court also held that the defendant's draft for $5,279.00 was
payment of the undisputed claim for the loss of the plaintiff's foot.
2. See Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict
of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565 (1920-1921).
3. See CARNAHAM, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
§11 (1958). For a discussion of four different rules considered by
the New York Courts in reaching a decision, see Jones v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y.S. 4 (1936).
4. See generally LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS §132 (1959); GOODRICI,
CONFLICT OF LAws §110 (1949); Beale, What Law Governs the Validity
of a Contract, 23 HARv.L.REv. 260 (1907).
5. This rule is generally asserted by the courts in determining the
validity of insurance contracts. See LENHOFF, CONF.ICT AvOEDANCE IN
INSURANCE, 21 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 549 (1956). For a
definition of the place where the contract was made as being the
place in which the principal event necessary to make a contract occurs,
see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §311 (d) (1934).
6. See e.g., Beck v. Downey, 191 F.2d 150, 152 (9th Cir. 1951) vacated
per curiam on other grounds, 343 U.S. 912, 96 L.Ed. 1328 (1952); GoOn-
RICH, op. cit. supra note 4 at §110.
7. See Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S.
397, 32 L.Ed. 788 (1889); Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221
F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp.,
167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948).
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infer from the surrounding circumstances an "implied" or
"hypothetical" intent.8
The latest position taken by the courts in choosing the con-
trolling law is that which has been termed the "center of
gravity" or the "grouping of contacts" theory. Under this
theory, the law of the place with the most significant contacts
governs, as that state is presumed to have the greatest interest
in the matter in dispute." This position was first taken by
the Indiana Supreme Court, which stated " ... the court will
consider all acts of the parties touching the transaction in re-
lation to the several states involved and will apply as the law
governing the transaction the law of that state with which
the facts are in most intimate contact."' 0
The leading New York case of Auten v. Auten," in a de-
parture from the orthodox rules, held New York law ap-
plicable under the "center of gravity" theory. However, the
Auten case dealt with performance of a separation agreement,
leaving open the question of whether such theory could be
used in determining the validity of a contract. The matter
was finally put to rest in the Second Circuit by Zogg v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co. 12 The question before the court was
whether New York's insurance law could be applied to a
Massachusetts insurance policy. The application of New York
law would have nullified a provision in the policy limiting
death benefits to a return of the premiums in the event of the
insured's suicide. Such a provision was valid under the laws
of Massachusetts, the state in which the court assumed the
contract to have been made. The court finding the rule as ex-
pressed in Auten"3 to be one of general application, held that
New York law would govern, rendering the limitation ineffec-
tive. In reaching its decision, the court stated that "[U]nder
the circumstances, a New York court could only conclude from
8. See Harper, Policy Bases on the Conflict of Laws; Reflections
on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essay, 56 YALE L.J. 1155, 1164
(1946-1947); Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts, Cases versus
Restatement, 51 YAL L.J. 893, 896 (1941-1942).
9. Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960),
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). See EHRENZWEG,
suprV a note 1 at §174. See Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305,
113 N.E.2d 424, 431 (1953) (for a preliminary analysis of the theory).
10. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945):
See generally, HARPER AND TAINTER, CASES OF CoNFIcT .OF LAWS, 173,
175 (1937).
11. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
12. 276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960).
13. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
[Vol. 15
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a grouping of the significant contacts that the validity of the
contract and its provisions is controlled by the law of the
forum, which includes its public policy as legislatively ex-
pressed." 14
Thus the "center of gravity" or the "grouping of contacts"
theory became the fourth rule used in determining the validity
of a contract under conflicting laws.
In the present case,15 the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
lied heavily upon Zogg. In reaching its decision, the court
placed particular emphasis on the significant contacts in-
volved, such as (1) the residence of the plaintiff at the time
of application for the policy, (2) the place of delivery, (3) the
point from which the premiums were mailed and (4) the place
where the injury occurred. These facts, coupled with the
state's manifest governmental interest in protecting the rights
of its citizens justified subjecting the contract to South Caro-
lina law.
The "center of gravity" or the "grouping of contacts" theory
has not been without criticism.'8 It has been said to have a
contact counting rather than a contact evaluation purpose,
7
affording little certainty or guidance for the courts and in-
volving great differences of opinions as to the most signifi-
cant contacts1 8 However, the theory has brought a much
needed flexibility into this area. Any mechanical rule radi-
cally restricts the range of facts pertinent to its application
and only in problems susceptible of mechanical disposition
is its employment justified.1 9 Rather than basing results on
rigid legal concepts such as place of contracting, place of per-
formance, or intention of the parties, the transaction should
be governed by the laws of the state with which it is most
intimately connected in terms of the closeness of the actual
14. Supra note 13, at 864.
15. Johnston v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n, - S.C. -,
131 S.E.2d 91, 94-95 (1963).
16. EHREaNZWEiG, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS, §174 (1962); Kramer, Interests
and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RUTGERs L.REV. 523,
546 (1959); see Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York,
1963 DuKu L.J. 1, 39-52. Professor Currie, in a critical analysis
of the center of gravity theory distinguishes between this theory and
that of governmental interest anaylsis, the latter advocated by- him.
17. Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement
of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IowA L.REv. 713, 724 (1961).
18. LEFLAR, op cit. supra note 4, at §125.
19. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problems, 45 HARv.L.
REV. 173, 192 (1926).
1963]
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contacts between that state and the significant acts of the
parties.
20
Two other aspects of the present case remain to be con-
sidered. The first relates to the general effect of Johnston as
to the validity of contracts in conflict cases in South Carolina.
The contract in question was an "adhesion ' 21 contract; that
is, an agreement in which one party's participation consists in
his mere adherence to a document drafted unilaterally22
(usually by a large enterprise). The present decision could
be part of a trend to apply the forum law in adhesion con-
tracts, due to the unequal bargaining power of the adherent
and the desire of the courts to protect him.23
It is submitted that the "center of gravity" theory as
adopted by the court in Johnston should not be confined to the
insurance field, but should be extended to other contract cases
in which a grouping of the significant contacts reflects a
state's governmental interest in the outcome of the litigation.
The second aspect deserving mention is that of the absence
of any constitutional issues in the present case. Query - had
the insured been a resident of another state at the time he
purchased the policy, would the application of the forum law
violate the constitutional requirements of due process or full
faith and credit? A case involving a similar fact situation
is now on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.24
The action involved a personal property floater policy taken
out by the plaintiff in Illinois. The plaintiff later moved to
Florida where the loss occurred. The policy contained a suit
clause which provided that no action could be maintained un-
less commenced within twelve months after discovery of loss.
This provision, though valid in Illinois, was invalid in Florida.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that constitutional due
process requirements precluded Florida from applying its law
to the contract purchased in Illinois. In the first appeal to the
Supreme Court, of particular interest is the dissenting
20. See HAnWER AND TAINTOR, CASES ON CONFIJCT O' LAws, §6 (1937).
21. This term was apparently used in this country for the first time
by Patterson, The Delvery of a Life Imuranwe Policy, 33 HARV.L.
REV. 198, 222 (1919).
22. See EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 16, at 454-458; WEINTRAUB,
supra note 17, at 715.
23. See LENHOFF, op. cit. supra note 5, 551-552.
24. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963). Petition
for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3103 (U.S. Sept. 16, 1963) (No. 470).
[Vol. 15
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opinion25 by Justice Black which leads one to the conclusion
that if the case appears again before the Supreme Court,
Florida law might be constitutionally applied. At the present,
however, the question remains open.
MICHAEL H. QUINN
25. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 213, 4 L.E.2d 1170,
1176 (1960). The Court, in hearing the case originally, remanded
to the Circuit Court for disposition of non-constitutional questions.
1963]
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ADMIRALTY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -
CONCURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE COVERAGE
FOR AMPHIBIOUS WORKERS
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co. (U.S.S.Ct. 1962)
Two workers were injured while engaged in the construc-
tion of barges located in navigable waters. In both cases the
deputy commissioner awarded compensation under the federal
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act I and the awards
were affirmed by the respective district courts.2 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed8 and the cases were
consolidated when the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 4 HELD: In a six to two opinion by Mr. Justice
Brennan, the Court reinstated the decisions of the district
courts and determined that Section 3 (a) of the Act6 means
that federal compensation is provided for all injuries sustained
by employees on navigable waters "whether or not a particular
injury might also be... within the constitutional reach of a
state workmen's compensation law." Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Calbeck, 370 U.S. 114, 117, 8 L.Ed.2d 368, 371 (1962).
This decision is a departure from the former policy of the
courts and the Congress in marking the respective jurisdic-
tions of the federal and state compensation laws. To fully
understand the importance of the decision, the history of
workmen's compensation on navigable waters must be ex-
amined.
1. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§901-50 (1958)
(constitutionality upheld in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 76 L.Ed. 598
(1932)).
2. Neither the decisions of the deputy commissioners nor those of
the district courts appear to have been reported.
3. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Donovan, 293 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1961);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961);
50 CALi.L.RwV. 342 (1962); 36 TULANE L.REv. 843 (1962).
4. Calbeek v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 946, 7 L.Ed.2d 342 (1961).
5. Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented; Mr.
Justice Franfarter took no part in the decision.
6. Section 3(a) of the act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C.A. §903(a)
(1958) reads in part:
(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect
of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery
for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceed-
ings may not validly be provided by State law.
982
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Compensation for land-based workers injured on navigable
waters was permitted under state workmen's compensation
laws by both state7 and federal8 courts until 1917. In that
year, the United States Supreme Court held, in Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen9 that since the Constitution extends the judicial
power of the United States to all cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction,'0 and gives the Congress the power to de-
termine substantive maritime law,1 state workmen's compen-
sation statutes could not be applied to injuries on navigable
waters. Any other interpretation would substantially interfere
with the constitutionally desired uniformity of admiralty and
maritime laws.
Public opinion was generally in favor of coverage for all
workers under workmen's compensation laws. In view of this,
the Congress twice enacted legislation which sought to avoid
the effect of Jensen.12 The attempts were of no avail; both
acts were subsequently held unconstitutional. 13
While the Congress fathomed the depths of maritime law
seeking relief for injured workers, the Court busied itself
developing a remedy consistent with Jensen; a troublesome
"maritime but local" doctrine began to arise.' 4 The theory
behind this doctrine was that uniformity of maritime law was
the purpose of Jensen and that there were certain activities
which, though maritime, were so local as to have little effect
on the general maritime law. In Grant-Smith-Porter Co. V.
Rohde,15 it was held that the employment of workers in the
construction of a vessel floating in navigable water was local
in scope and that an application of the state workmen's
compensation law would not interfere with the uniform ad-
ministration of the maritime law.'6 This "maritime but local"
7. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 AtL 372
(1915); Lindstrom v. Mutual S.S. Co., 132 Minn. 328, 156 N.W. 669
(1916); see generally, Annot. 25 A.L.R. 1029 (1923).
8. Riegel v. Higgins, 241 Fed. 718 (N.D.Cal. 1917); Berton v.
Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 Fed. 763 (D.N.J. 1915); see generally,
Annot. 25 A.L.R. 1029 (1923).
9. 244 U.S. 205, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917).
10. U.S. Const. art. HI §2.
11. U.S. Const. art. I §8 cl. 18.
12. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 1, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922,
ch. 216, 1, 42 Stat. 634.
13. Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 68 L.Ed. 646
(1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 64 L.Ed.
834 (1920).
14. Western Fruit Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 66 L.Ed. 210 (1921).
15. 257 U.S. 469, 66 L.Ed. 321 (1921).
16. It should be noted that the facts of Grant-Smith-Porter are almost
identical with those of the instant case.
8
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doctrine brought about an ad hoc administration of cases and
the lack of uniformity caused great difficulty in the adminis-
tration of the state compensation statutes.
In 1927 a federal workmen's compensation act for maritime
workers was passed.17 This act is generally considered, in
addition to providing a federal source of compensation, to
have codified the "maritime but local" criterion as to the
applicability of state acts.1 8 It is arguable that the doctrine
should have ended with the enactment of a federal workmen's
compensation law, but it did not. The ad hoc approach to
jurisdiction remained detrimental to the worker seeking
remedy. One of the principal reasons for the enactment of
workmen's compensation laws was to provide a speedy source
of relief for injured workers. When each case must be decided
on its merits as to jurisdiction, the workers are faced with
lengthy and complicated litigation before recovery can be
effected. In addition, if the worker were to choose the wrong
jurisdiction, he might find himself out of court due to the
running of the customarily short statutes of limitations prev-
alent in compensation statutes. Employers as well as em-
ployees had problems: they had no way of knowing whether
to insure under the state or federal statute. The usual solu,
tion was dual coverage.
The stormy career of the "maritime but local' doctrine was
modified when Mr. Justice Black, in Davis v. Department of
Labor & Indus.1 0 created the "twilight zone." This term re-
ferred to those cases in which counsel could not predict the
proper forum for the action; a presumption was created that,
in such cases, counsel's choice was correct. The Court sub-
sequently decided that the "twilight zone" was very broad.20
Thus, the worker could elect either a federal or a state remedy,
If a remedy under the state compensation act were elected,
the application of such relief would be presumed constitu-
tional.21 Further, if federal administrative relief were sought,
17. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§901-50 (1958).
18. GILMORE & BLAcx, ADMBIALTY, 346 (1957); 2 LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S CODPENSATION LAW, §§89.00-.22 (1962).
19. 317 U.S. 249, 87 L.Ed. 246 (1942).
20. Baskin v. Industrial Aec. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854, 94 L.Ed. 523
(1949) (per curiam).
21. Thus it is reversible error for a court to deny compensation for
an injury which fell in the "twilight zone." Id.
984 [Vol. 15
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the decision - right or wrong - would be granted adminis-
trative finality.
22
The "twilight zone" greatly aided the injured worker, but
the question of the extent of its broadness caused trouble;
the extent of the broadness of the zone remained to be deter-
mined in each case just as it had been necessary in each
case to determine what constituted "maritime but local."
23
The most usual statement of the extent of the zone was that
it included all waterfront injuries in which there was a rea-
sonable doubt as to the applicable compensation statute.
24
When the instant case was decided, the law was generally
said to be:
... (1) that whenever enough doubt existed as to whether
federal or state acts applied and a rational argument
could be made for either, the employee had a choice of
remedies; (2) the choice was to be respected by ad-
ministrators and courts regardless of previous "maritime
but local" cases holding that this particular job was in
the other area; and (3) employers had better insure any
employee who worked for any length of time on both
land and water (amphibious worker) under both federal
and state act 2 5
The decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the in-
stant case 26 seemed to be well reasoned. In the light of an
earlier decision, 27 the case was one clearly characterized as
"maritime but local" and therefore was not within the "twi-
light zone." The decisions below which granted and affirmed
relief seemed clearly reversible.
However, the United States Supreme Court, after studying
the legislative history of the act, determined that Congress
intended that the Act should furnish compensation to all
workers injured on navigable waters. The Jensen case had
22. Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees, 68
HARV.L.REV. 637 (1955).
23. It should be noted that in Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus.,
uZpra n. 19, the suggestion is quite clear that (contrary to Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra n. 9) the state and federal remedies are
not mutually exclusive.
24. See Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 3
L.Ed.2d 292 (1959).
25. Note, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 532, 537 (1963).
26. Avondale Shipyards Inc. v. Donovan, 293 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1961);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeek, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961).
27. Grant-Smith-Porter v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 66 L.Ed. 321 (1922).
1963]
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indicated that states could not apply their acts to navigable
waters. Subsequent decisions brought about the "maritime
but local" doctrine as an exception. The original wording of
the statute excluded employment ". . . of local concern."' 28
Therefore, the substituted phrase in Section 3(a), ". . . if
recovery... may not validly be provided by a state law" is
not the same as "maritime but local" but merely means that
the federal act did not extend beyond the limits set out in
Jensen.20 The opinion of the Court was that Congress had
intended by Section 3(a) to provide recovery without ex-
pensive and time-consuming litigation over what constitutes
"maritime but local." Such a conclusion does not seem war-
ranted by the legislative history of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Act.30
This interpretation produces an anomaly; the Court did not
expressly overrule any of the previous cases dealing with
"maritime but local" or the "twilight zone." But, if the
"maritime but local" doctrine was not incorporated in the Act,
as had previously been thought,31 then there is no reason to
continue the application of the doctrine. Accordingly, the "twi-
light zone" has no further reason for existence: its sole pur-
pose was to avoid the dilemma caused by the "maritime but
local" doctrine. 32
This failure to undermine the extension to local jurisdiction
of maritime cases does not seem to cause any appreciable de-
gree of non-uniformity to the maritime and admiralty law:
Jensen is still viable. In its narrowest sense, the Jensen case
only prohibited state compensation to longshoremen injured
on navigable waters.33 Workers now seem to have a choice
with no chance that their remedy will be precluded. If the
injury occurs on land, the state act will clearly provide a
remedy; if the injury occurs on navigable water, the worker
28. Hearings on S. 8170 Before Senate Judiciary Committee, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926).
29. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 124-126, 8 L.Ed.2d
363, 375-376 (1962).
30. Note, 1963 Du L.J. 327, n. 17.
31. GILmaoRE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 18, at 346; 2 LARSoN, op. cit.
supra note 18, at §§89.00-.22.
32. But see Matherne v. Superior Oil Co., 207 F. Supp. 591 (E.D.La.
1962) and Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Co., 306 F.2d 369
(6th Cir. 1962) where the court paid lip-service to the "twilight zone"
despite the decision in the instant case.
33. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 337, 97 L.Ed.
367, 371 (1953) (dictum); Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 218,
<1959) overruling on rehearing en banc, 265 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 15
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will clearly be able to invoke the federal remedy and will
probably be able to seek recovery under the state laws if the
injury was incurred within the "twilight zone."'34 In the final
analysis, the rule seems to be that the federal act is applicable
whether or not the state act might be constitutional.
Such a clarification serves to eliminate a doubtful area in
the administration of admiralty and maritime laws as they re-
late to the applicability of various compensation acts for
maritime workers. Consequently, the workers are given the
benefit of the federal statute without depriving them of the
right to seek redress in the state courts if it is available.
DAVID Y. MONTEITH III
34. It is unlikely, except in a few cases, that workers will choose
the state act if the federal act is available; in all but those few cases,
the federal benefits are more advantageous. See U.S.DEPT. OF LABOR BULL.
No. 161, 10-38 (1961 Supp.). See also 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATiON IAw at 524-58 (App. B) (1962).
12
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ABRIDGEMENT OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM - DENIAL OF
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO SEVENTH-DAY
ADVENTIST REFUSING SATURDAY WORK
Sherbert v. Verner (U.S. 1963)
Appellant, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was discharged by
her employer for her refusal to work on Saturday, the Sab-
bath Day of her faith, and was refused unemployment com-
pensation by the South Carolina Employment Security Com-
mission on the ground that she was not available for work
and had rejected suitable work without good cause. The
Court of Common Pleas sustained the Commission and the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed' holding that dis-
qualifying appellant did not restrict her religious freedom.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that to deny compensation to appellant because she
refused to work on her Sabbath restricted the free exercise
of her religion, that there was no compelling state interest
to justify the restriction, and that the extension of unem-
ployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday
worshippers did not foster the establishment of the Seventh-
Day Adventist religion in South Carolina. Sherbert v. Verner,
83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963).
The first amendment freedoms, including that of religion,
apply to states as well as to the federal government by
reason of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,2 and neither the state nor the federal government can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another; neither can force or influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his
will. 3 The constitutional guaranty of freedom of religion
applies to all kinds or forms of government action whether
taken by the state legislature or state judiciary.4 The free
exercise clause of the first amendment forbids any govern-
1. Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
2. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R.
1352 (1940).
3. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 91 L.Ed. 711, 168 A.L.R.
1392 (1947).
4. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140
(1960).
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ment regulation of religious beliefs as such.5 However, an in-
cidental burden upon one's constitutional liberties, including
that of religion, may be justified by a compelling state in-
terest in the regulation of a subject within the state's con-
stitutional power to regulate.6
The two primary issues before the Court were whether
or not appellant's free exercise of religion had been infringed
upon, and if so, was there any compelling state interest to
justify the infringement.
The view of the majority opinion was that the South Caro-
lina Court's ruling forced appellant to choose between fol-
lowing the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to be eligible for work on the other. The
ruling put pressure on appellant to forego the practice of
observing Saturday as a day of rest as her religion required.
This was held to be an infringement of appellants free
exercise of religion even though the burden imposed was
concededly incidental and indirect. A law which impedes
observance of one or all religions, or discriminates invidiously
between religions, is constitutionally invalid, even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.7 As
to the contention that unemployment benefits were not ap-
pellant's "right" but merely a "privilege," the Court felt
that the ruling conditioned the availability of benefits upon
appellant's willingness to violate a principle of her religious
faith. Regardless of their purpose, conditions on public
benefits cannot be sustained if they inhibit or deter the
exercise of first amendment freedoms.8 No state may exclude
any individual from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation because of his faith or lack of it. 9
In the dissenting opinion,10 it was argued that, since the
statute was designed to compensate persons involuntarily
unemployed due to the inability of industry to provide them a
job, the appellant, who had voluntarily withdrawn from the
labor market because of personal considerations, was not
5. Cantwell v. Connecticut, upra note 2.
6. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 600, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961); Cf.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1962).
7. Braunfield v. Brown, sup,ra note 6.
8. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958).
9. Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 3.
10. Sherbert v. Verner, - U.S. -, 10 L.Ed.2d 968, 979 (1963).
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"Involuntarily unemployed." It was felt that appellant's
religious convictions were wholly without relevance to the
state court's application of the law and that appellant was
denied compensation not because of her religion but because
she wads not "available for work" within the meaning of the
statute. The weakness of this argument lies in the fact
that in filing her claim, appellant, a millworker, had ex-
pressed a willingness to accept work, even in another in-
dustry, so long as Saturday work was not required. Had
appellant been willing to work only in the mills, all of which
operated six days per week, it might be justifiable to say
she had removed herself from the labor market.
Even though infringement of one's free exercise of religion
is found, the action may be sustained if some compelling
state interest is shown as justification. The Court cited
Thorms v. Collins11 in which the requirements for such jus-
tifying interest are set out. The mere showing of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest will not suffice.
It is only the gravest abuses, abuses which seriously endanger
paramount interests that will give occasion for permissible
limitation. In the instant case, the Court found no such
abuses.
Appellees suggested that the possibility of the filing of
fraudulent claims by claimants feigning religious objection
to Saturday work might not only deplete the unemployment
compensation funds, but also hinder the scheduling by em-
ployers of necessary Saturday work. The Court refused
ruling on this point since it had not been raised in the South
Carolina Court. By way of dictum, however, the Court indi-
cated that possible depletion of funds and inconvenience to
employers would not be sufficient grounds to justify a sub-
stantial infringement of religious liberties. Granting benefits
in cases such as the one under consideration would not dis-
rupt the entire system of unemployment compensation. In
such cases 12 other states have granted compensation without
serious complications. In addition, the present record indi-
cated that out of the one hundred and fifty Seventh-Day
Adventists living in appellant's area, only two were un-
11. 323 U.S. 516, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945).
12. E.g. In re Miller, 243 N.C. .509, 91 S.E.2d 241 (1956); Swenson
v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm., 340 Mich. 430, 65 N.W.2d 709
(1954); Tary v. Board of Review, 161 Ohio 251, 119 N.E.2d 56 (1954).
[Vol. 15
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employed.'$ Furthermore, the opportunities to defraud the
state in order to obtain the benefits could be checked, at
least in the sense of taking periodically compensated rests.
Such checks could take the form of state inquiry into the
sincerity of one's religious beliefs or the requirement that
a claimant make himself available for another type work,
not conflicting with his religious convictions before allowing
him to receive compensation benefits.'
4
Mr. Justice Stewart, who concurred in result only, and
the dissenting Justices criticized the case on two points:
that the present holding was in conflict with the holding of
Braunfield v. Brown' 5 and that the holding was inconsistent
with prior cases dealing with the establishment clause of
the first amendment.
In Braunfield, an orthodox Jew attacked the validity of a
Sunday Closing Law alleging that his religion required him
to close on Saturday and that he would not be able to con-
tinue in business unless he was allowed to open on Sunday.
The Court recognized that the statute would make the prac-
tice of his religion more expensive, but held that the secular
objective (the compelling state interest) of providing a
uniform day of rest for all workers overcame this fact. In
the instant case, the Court took notice of the fact that other
states found ways to compensate Seventh-Day Adventists
in appellant's situation, but in Braunfieid they ignored the
factor that twenty-one out of thirty-four states having Sun-
day Laws at the time provided exceptions for Sabbatar-
ians,' 6 and held that the secular objective could be achieved
in no other practical way. The Court stated "if the state
regulates conduct by enacting within its power general law
whose purpose and effect is to advance the state's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance, unless a state may accomplish its
purpose by means which do not impose such a burden."17
The secular objective of the state here is much clearer than
in Braunfield as it must be admitted that the Sunday Laws,
whatever their present purpose, were originally religiously
13. Sherbert v. Verner, - U.S. -, 10 L.Ed.2d 968, n. 2.
14. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944).
15. Braunfield v. Brown, supra note 6.
16. Id. at 614, 6 L.Ed.2d at 573.
17. Id. at 607, 6 L.Ed.2d at 568.
19631
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motivated. Also the financial burden and the pressure im-
posed upon religious practices seem less here than in Braun-
field for that case involved a criminal statute while here the
most that appellant could lose would be twenty-two weeks of
unemployment benefits. Finally, in Braunfield it was thought
that the "compelling state interest" could not otherwise be
achieved practically because to make an exemption would
require a case by case inquiry into religious beliefs, resulting
in higher administrative and police costs. It may be pointed
out that here also a case by case inquiry is likely to be re-
quired with resulting higher administrative and investiga-
tive costs. The dissenting Justices, while not agreeing ex-
plicitly with Braunfield, left no doubt that they thought that
the instant case overruled Braunfield despite the Court's
attempt to distinguish it.
Justice Stewart, concurring in result, and the dissenters
felt that the holding here conflicted with the Court's prior
decisions interpreting the establishment clause, because that
clause as priorly construed forbids the financial support
of government to be placed behind a particular religious be-
lief.' s The effect of this decision will be that South Caro-
lina will be required to single out an individual and pay him
compensation when his refusal to work is based solely on
religious convictions. Thus the state is compelled to give
special treatment to those of a particular religious faith.
The majority felt that its holding represented only "neutrality
in the face of religious differences" and that it did not foster
the establishment of religion in South Carolina. This view
is not supported by logic for appellant will be paid compen-
sation because of her religion. The result is a conflict be-
tween the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
Such conflicts are inevitable. Here the Supreme Court had
a chance to clear up some of the confusion resulting from
conflicts between these two clauses, but it failed to do so.
Because of this confusion and because this case renders the
authority of Braunfield at least uncertain, more litigation
can be expected in this area should analogous situations arise
in the future.
Undoubtably the effect of the decision will be that South
Carolina will have to pay compensation to claimants in ap-
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pellant's position, but the theory under which the state
will proceed remains to be seen. There seem to be two
choices open. South Carolina can either stand on the con-
stitutional ground as decided in the present case, or it may
reinterpret its statute in accordance with the views of
other states that have faced the problem.19 The latter choice
would require South Carolina to adopt a view rejected by
all but one of its justices, 20 but this is the better choice. It
would bring South Carolina into line with the other juris-
dictions, and since the statutes are practically uniform, the
interpretations of other courts could furnish a guide for
the South Carolina courts.
WILBURN BREWER, JR.
19. Cases cited note 12, supra.
20. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 10, dissenting opinion.
19631
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TORTS - CONTRIBUTION - INTERSPOUSAL
IMMUNITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTRIBUTION
WHERE ONE SPOUSE IS JOINT TORTFEASORI
Bedell v. Reagan (Me. 1963)
Plaintiffs, who were husband and wife, instituted an action
against defendant for injuries and consequential losses sus-
tained in an automobile collision in which the wife was a
passenger in an automobile driven and owned by the husband.
Defendant was the driver and owner of the automobile which
collided with that of the husband. Defendant denied liability
and filed a third party complaint against the husband alleg-
ing that the collision was due to the negligence of the hus-
band. The third party complaint charged the husband with
-an obligation to contribute or indemnify for damages sus-
tained as a result of the wife's action against the defendant.
The Superior Court granted the husband's motion to dismiss
the defendant's third party complaint for contribution. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine overruled the motion and
remanded the case on the ground that even though husband
and wife as reciprocal spouses could not maintain causes of
action one against the other for negligent torts, the defend-
ant could maintain a third party complaint against the hus-
band for contribution based on the participating or joint neg-
ligence of the husband which resulted in injury to the wife.
Bedell v. Reagan, 192 A.2d 24 (1963).
It is settled in Maine that a husband and wife may not
sue each other for negligent torts.2 It is also settled in Maine
that there may be contribution between negligent joint tort-
feasors.3 Consequently, a situation in which one joint tort-
feasor is the spouse of the injured party presents an irrec-
onciliable problem. The present court maintained that there
is greater justice in equitably distributing liability for neg-
ligent conduct than in preserving a marital union which has
only a probability of being disrupted as a result of a suit for
1. For an excellent coverage of the cases in this area see Annot.,
19 A.L.R.2d 100 (1957) and Annot., 60 A.L.R2d 1385 (1958).
2. Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me. 54, 188 AtL 724 (1937).
3. Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Mle. 449, 104 Atl. 815 (1918).
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'contribution. This is a minority view4 followed by only one
other state.5
The prevailing view is that contribution depends on the
common liability of the joint tortfeasors to the injured party.
Thus, where one tortfeasor is not liable to the injured party
because he or she is the spouse of the injured party6 or be-
cause a parent-child relation exists, 7 the right to contribution
does not exist. This concept of a common liability has also
precluded contribution where the injured party has assumed
the risk of injury as to one tortfeasor, but has not assumed
the risk of injury as to the other tortfeasor.8 The right to
contribution is deemed derivative and does not create a new
cause of action.9 Therefore, if one tortfeasor is not liable
to the injured party, the other tortfeasor does not acquire
any right of action from the injured party by assuming com-
plete liability for the damages. The Minnesota court10 rea-
soned that common liability was essential since contribution
was actually compensation given in equity for removing the
burden of liability of one tortfeasor by another. When no
common burden exists, no compensation should be given.
The minority view, as expressed in the Pennsylvania case
of Fisher v. Diehl," attacks the argument of the majority,
that to permit contribution would, in effect, allow one spouse
to recover from the other. A judgment against a negligent
spouse by the joint tortfeasor is not enforceable by the in-
jured spouse nor does it enure to that spouse's benefit. It
is simply a judgment enuring to the benefit of the joint
tortfeasor. The marital relation of the injured party and
one of the tortfeasors should not destroy the substantive
4. Yellow Cab Co. of D.C. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Ackerson v. Kibler, 138 Misc. 695, 246 N.Y.S. 580, aff'd 232 App. Div.
306, 249 N.Y.S. 629 (1939); Scruggs v. Meredith, 135 F. Supp. 376
(D.C. Hawaii 1955); Rogers v. Galindo, 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400
(1961); American Auto Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d
847 (1953); Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 648 (1960);
Kenedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954); In Reed v. Stone,
176 F. Supp. 463 (1959), the District Court of Maine held, in applying
Maine law, that the negligent spouse was not liable for contribution
since there was no common liability of both the tortfeasors to the injured
party. The present court surprisingly fails to mention this case.
5. Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945).
6. Yellow Cab Co. of D.C. v. Dreslin, supra note 4.
7. Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wise. 601, 229 N.W. 74 (1930).
8. Kauth v. Landsverk, 225 Wis. 254, 271 N.W. 841 (1937).
9. Ennis v. Donovan, supra note 4. °
10. American Auto Ins. Co. v. Molling, supra note 4.
11. Fisher v. Diehl, supra note 5.
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 5 [1963], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss5/6
SOUTH CAROLiNA LAW RviEw [
rights of outsiders. The common law fiction of the legal
unity of husband and wife and the pragmatic argument of
preserving domestic harmony and felicity are not applicable
where injustice is produced upon third parties. To hold
otherwise would permit a spouse to profit by his wrongful
or negligent conduct. The majority,12 however, believe that
a spouse will not profit by his own wrong since any recovery
would be the separate property of the injured spouse.
The minority view is theoretically the better, while the
majority view is the more realistic. It has been said that
"as jurisprudence becomes emancipated from the notion that
liability in tort is largely penal in character, the principle
of contribution may become extended rather than re-
stricted."'13 This is the direction in which the Maine court
is moving. Its basis is analogous to that of the doctrine of
comparative negligence by which a plaintiff who is contribu-
torily negligent may still recover from a defendant who is
also negligent, but to a greater degree. Despite the equity
which is produced by this view, it fails to consider the
practical effect of recovery by contribution from a husband
for his joint negligence in injuring his wife. Will a wife
sue at all knowing that her husband might be liable for a
part of her damages? If a wife does sue- against her hus-
band's wishes, will their marriage be disrupted? When con-
sidered in light of these questions, the present decision will
not produce greater justice. The substantive right of a spouse
to sue is as important as the right of the third party to
incur no more liability than is just. In fact, the right of
the spouse might be greater since she or he is completely
innocent, while the third party is at least partially at fault.
Permitting a third party joint tortfeasor to recover con-
tribution from a joint tortfeasor spouse makes the injured
spouse reluctant to sue for fear that the marriage will be
disrupted.
Despite the practical deficiency of the present decision,
the tendency in this area is towards a more theoretical ap-
plication of the law. More courts are beginning to accept
contribution among negligent joint tortfeasors,14 and many
12. Rogers v. Galindo, supra note 4.
13. HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 717 (1st ed. 1956).
14. PRosSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 249 (2d ed. 1955); see also, HApEn
& JAMES, op. cit. supra note 13, pp. 715-717.
[Vol. 15
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statutes have been passed which adopt the comparative neg-
ligence theory of apportioning damages. Consequently, even
though it might be more practical to deny a defendant the
right to contribution from a spouse of the injured party,
there is the growing realization that liability should be im-
posed in an exact correlation to the fault of the defendant.
It is submitted that if a means is established to measure
the fault of a person, the doctrine of contribution might be
abolished entirely, thereby allowing an injured party to re-
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